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In our belated attempts to steward, care for, or 'repair' environments, and when we 
transform individual animals and animal populations considered to be ‘endangered’ from 
beings and societies into data, what of consequence is really captured—and, more 
importantly, what is lost? 
For fourteen years, we have examined, through our art practice, human/animal 
interfaces both historical and contemporary. These have included, for instance, the 
critical scrutiny of cultural constructs such as pests, pets, the wild, the domestic and of 
the colonial appropriation, representation, and strategic elimination of entire species. The 
focus of our research has been upon the engagement and exchange by which those 
relationships are constituted, attempting to put emphasis on neither the anthropocentric 
nor zoocentric perspectives, but instead on their flux and interplay. Pointing ever more 
insistently to environmental viewpoints and embracing the inclusive dynamics of 
distributive agency, such relationships themselves are continually subject to reflex and 
change.(1) This has become particularly telling in light of an increasing willingness to 
allow consideration of animal consciousness and zoocentric positions into our fields of 
vision and affect.    
The we of “we” 
In the news and media, as well as in the context of a growing awareness of 
environmental decline and degradation stemming from human behavior and activity, 
much air time and column width is given to environmental issues. It is striking, however, 
that in interviews about environmental change with experts in the field, such as 
climatologists and conservationists not to mention less specialized commentators, there 
is a palpable avoidance and/or reluctance to use the term “we” to signify anything other 
than the human species. In the anthropocentric view, which in the West we are all 
conditioned to espouse, it is as if to acknowledge the environmental crisis, by invoking its 
catastrophic effects upon a multitude of other species, would be to destabilize or divert 
an otherwise rational argument. Human need is an anthropocentric given, and as such 
beyond contest—as a consequence, the human “we” remains culturally blind to the needs 
of an environmental constituency comprising myriad other species and their/our co-
relation/co-production. 
 
As artists researching and producing in this field, it is our belief that no significant change 
in exploitative habits and capitalist consumption will ever satisfactorily or effectively 
occur, unless we collectively acknowledge, accommodate and mobilize the use of the 
term “we” to mean not only humans, but all organisms living here on planet Earth.  
Conscious of the necessarily misrepresentative effects of generalization, we have always 
been at pains strategically to ground our work by means of the specific within the context 
of the general.(2) We take this general context to be informed and constituted by what 
are accepted cultural constructs. A non-humanly-mediated environment is nothing more 
than an ecology, or site of ecology. Thinking about “environment” and accepting the 
concept of interconnectivity, human beings must at some point acknowledge a global 
ecology and all the chemistry, micro-organisms, and species of flora and fauna that exist 
within it and by which it is comprised. Rosi Braidotti neatly summons the paradox of 
complexity and specificity like this: 
A location is a materialist temporal and spatial site of coproduction of subjects in 
their diversity. Accounting for this is, therefore, anything but an instance of 
relativism.(3) 
Accounting for human action must, if it is to have any credence in the future, embody a 
new way of thinking beyond the anthropocentric and the absolute. In this short text we 
point to some of our own preoccupations as artists challenging routine thought patterns 
by destabilizing what Western-thinking humans think they know. 
Recurrent issues that we have addressed in our projects—for instance, in a 2009 
installation entitled between you and me—include the power and consequences of 
naming and of representation more broadly.(4) In our 2004 project Big Mouth, we 
examined the extirpation of the Tasmanian Tiger or Thylacine from the island of Tasmania 
which signaled the species’ extinction. We examined this power of “naming” both to 
affect, and in the latter case, to seal the fate of an entire species.(5) A name is a 
signifying skin assigned to stand for something. That skin, like all representations, serves 
unwittingly (or not), to occlude the thing it is supposed to represent – in this case the 
animal that exists within and part of an environment, for which that environment is an 
extension and the overall constitution of which informs and contributes to its being. This 
name, and our human reliance upon it as a handle of convenience, supplants the real. It 
appears to denote but in fact simply directs our understanding towards an illusion of 
finite and unchanging difference. This is an unintentional disregard arising from an idea 
of fixity, in that a name by which something is referenced necessarily must be 
dependable and remain consistent. It cuts off our ability to recognize, or more importantly 
to expect and be alert to difference or deviation within the thing or being observed, 
witnessed, or experienced. Importantly, when examining a non-human animal, the 
repeated application of a name reduces our capacity to grasp the idea that it might be 
something other than a construct that human beings have the faculties to register. In this 
act of naming, the appreciation of the individual animal itself and its particular ecological 
conditions is thereby suppressed or extinguished entirely. 
Startlingly, the effect of this is that when difference is encountered beyond that conjured 
by the behaviors-set of the representational image, it is dismissed as being idiosyncratic. 
In effect, the name serves or attempts to neutralize the non-human animal as a set of 
recognizable, familiar, repetitive, and repeating behaviors. Rather than being an 
extension to the species’ ontology and human knowledge, newly observed traits are 
thought probably to be aberrant and not worthy of attention.(6)  
This is the notoriously reductive nature by which science is seen by many to function in 
the world. The need to repeat and to be able to predict behavior and conditions is one of 
the qualities necessary for scientific endeavor to be recognized as such. Curiously, the 
idea of the repeatable so often fails to take into account and even precludes an 
allowance or recognition of conditional differences—differences very often signified by, or 
arising from, changed contexts and circumstances. In short, when considering the 
behaviors of elements, minerals, environmental growth patterns, biological systems, or 
species of plants, animals and birds, those conditions which mediate and potentially 
challenge the repeatable (and thus render it more mutable and more unstable) are 
eradicated. For taxonomic and classification purposes, it is almost a tautology that the 
rational mind is conditioned to seek static and reliable models. 
We assume that this is a cultural rather than a blanket human tendency—that Western 
societies have come to be this way—to look first for ‘things’ in order subsequently to 
scrutinize them in isolation and to use their assigned characteristics as maps and models 
by which to proceed.  
Paradoxically, this kind of taxonomy—the kind that strips away the conditional—exists as 
an antithesis to ideas of flux and change, and thus to evolution. Taxonomy sits in 
opposition to what is fundamentally accepted as an ever-changing world, one that is 
intrinsically responsive and reactive to specific and local deviations that, when 
concentrated and sustained within a particular locale at sufficient intensities, will 
assimilate and reflect profoundly and irrevocably such changes.  
 
As a means of tracking and understanding the world it has become common practice to 
generate data, turning populations of beings into sets of tables which reflect broad 
tendencies and effects. As a kind of ‘boiling down’ process, the figures are used as a 
basis from which to deduce and draw conclusions, which in turn drive the mobilization of 
particular actions. Such data and actions rarely privilege or acknowledge animal 
individuation. By accumulation they simply constitute a generalized body of information 
from which action can rationally be promoted.  
 
The reluctance to corral a consciousness of the human species into the same frame as 
others stems from a long-established tendency to consider the human as special—literally, 
as exceptional. Popular knowledge and all manner of data and facts now support the 
idea that we are biologically very close to plants, never mind our animal cousins. As 
Donna Haraway points out:  
I love the fact that human genomes can be found in only 10 percent of all the cells 
that occupy my body; the other 90 percent of the cells are filled with the genomes 
of bacteria, fungi, protists, and such, some of which play in a symphony necessary 
to my being alive at all, and some of which are hitching a ride and doing the rest of 
me, of us, no harm. I am vastly outnumbered by my tiny companions […]  To be one 
is always to become one with many. (7)  
If the case is to be made regarding the term “we,” and its potential as an ecological tool 
for modifying and improving our perceptual grasp on our place within the world, then this 
understanding is key. We have to re-imagine our human selves as existing alongside and 
in some way equalized with all other flora, fauna, bacteria, fungi, protozoa etc.—but in 
fact this imaginary is made simpler because we are ourselves constituted in large part by 
these other species. “We” all carry each other around. “We” replenish each other and 
continually move in and out of “us.” We are part of and collectively, the entirety of the flux 
of an interspecific “us.”  
What I do to the world, therefore, I do to myself.  
Part of the perceptual inadequacy that obstructs this view arises from an inability to 
conceive of the timescales involved in evolutionary change. The human lifespan is simply 
not long enough to take seriously or even recognize signs of significant, large-scale 
environmental change. Any awareness there may be of the proliferations of storms, 
flashfloods or heat-waves is often qualified and countered by the delusional reassurance 
that such extremes have always existed and, therefore, signal no change of any lasting 
consequence. Science tells us otherwise, but the tendency is to take “uncomfortable” 
science with a pinch of salt in ways that run counter to a more characteristic acceptance 
of and passive reliance upon it.  
Implicit in this reluctance is a bleak message about human nature or, more specifically, 
the impossibility of the distance we have travelled as a global society from understanding 
a world that we knew previously as hunter-gatherers. Where once the relations between 
place, denizens and seasons would have been ontologically implicit, human dependence 
now is on a world of specialist services, skill-sets, and technologies supported by 
intermediary currencies and language that extend the perceptual gap and our inability to 
engage with the reality of the planet. Irrationally, there seems to be an unbreakable 
relationship between what is seen as rational thought and its foundation in the 
imperative of human need. 
 
In this fragile context the sustainability of conservation strategies is as much under threat 
as its respective subjects. For as long as funding is made available, conservation 
programs may be sustained and individual species conserved. But when that funding 
dries up or is redirected, strategies will be curtailed and species' survival put in jeopardy 
because the complex factors threatening the species are not holistically addressed. 
Conservation is a costly and temporary life-support system, but it is also an admirable 
practice predicated on sweet hope. Its optimism and most promising prospect is that 
cultural approaches to the environment will become more joined-up. In this context, at 
this time, conservation’s holding strategy is a bid to stay the hour of what seems like 
inevitable execution.  
 
Rebecca Solnit observes: 
 
'It is in the nature of things to be lost and not otherwise… 
 
...It is as though we make the exception the rule, believe that we should have 
rather than that we will generally lose. We should be able to find our way back 
again by the objects we dropped, like Hansel and Gretel in the forest, the object 
reeling us back in time, undoing each loss, a road back from lost eyeglasses to lost 
toys and baby teeth. 
 
The story of extincting species, especially now, is the story of the failure to love. It 
is a letter of affection never sent.(8) 
And so it will remain until some as yet unseen epiphany reveals the mutuality of our 
shared predicament, and human selfishness at last provides the necessary consensus 
and spur to act.     
Humans are heavy animals—they move through the landscape crushing and pounding the 
ground, damaging myriad small organisms beneath their feet without knowing what it is 
they destroy. As a knowing species, however, humans have extensive knowledge of the 
metaphorical footprint applied to the organisms of the earth. The ever-growing human 
population weighs more and more heavily on the planet while simultaneously 
commanding comprehensive and precise data by which to register and record its impact. 
Given that artists in any discipline are not obliged to tell “the truth,” there may be nothing 
at all of worth here. This is particularly true when the authors are equally complicit in 
matters environmental—we aspire and fall short. Everything uttered regarding the we of 
the “we” is open to ethical critique and charges of duplicity. Indeed, our wavering in the 
world mirrors precisely the human inertia to which we point and flap in this text. 
As artists, being asked to act as go-betweens or facilitators between science and the 
general public raises a curious paradox. From our perspective, there’s no doubt that 
science commands more passive trust in the public mind than does art. The opinion of 
the general public regarding art is largely one of disinterest arising from a perception of 
its irrelevance. To a smaller segment of the public there is undoubtedly interest in more 
palatable and “attractive” art that offers little or no threat to a populist status quo.  To a 
tiny proportion of the public, an interest in art coalesces around challenge and critique—
even philosophical radicalism. So given that what we are likely to produce from our 
research addresses the third, small audience directly, and perhaps uses strategies of 
aesthetics and spectacle in ways that may tempt the second, the question is: How can 
what is produced as art effectively or in any way, tax the consciousness of an 
environmentally aloof and unconcerned majority?  
In light of what can only be described as the international inability to respond 
imaginatively and ecologically to an obvious environmental need, the ambition for 
recalibrating our cognitive thinking towards constructive ecological uncertainty and 
deference is unlikely to be realized across the board any time soon. The imperative 
therefore must be to introduce incremental shifts in our cultural approach. As artists, we 
see our work in its project-based and serial manifestations as a way towards that end. 
The nature and implementation of the work as critique and discourse, both short term 
and longer term, quite naturally sits as components of, and in extension to, the work itself. 
It functions as a tool to increase the visibility and impact of embedded ideas, to extend 
the resonance of the work across multiple fields, and to serve as a means by which to 
test its effects. 
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